The Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by Warns, Carl A.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
2-1-1949
The Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Carl A. Warns
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carl A. Warns, The Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 U. Miami L. Rev. 235 (1949)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol3/iss2/5
THE NATURE OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
CARL A. WARNS*
Although the traditional bi-parte legal contract is an accepted element
in our commercial and personal relations, it does not follow that the body of
law built up around such a contract can successfully be applied in the field
of industrial relations. It is commonly known that issues arising from the
interpretation and enforcement of a labor "contract" are in many cases the
source of industrial instability, and frequently the effects of these issues reach
far beyond the limits of the particular company directly involved. This being
true, it is incumbent upon those who interpret and enforce the agreement to
understand its true nature. Yet an examination of the legal history of the
labor contract indicates that the courts have rarely understood its real sig-
nificance, or if they have understood it, they have been confined by tradition-
al concepts incdealing with it. The recent attempt in Congress to make the
labor contract "enforceable" on the national level by making unions amenable
to process under the Taft-Hartley Law indicates that the legislators share
with the courts a lack of realistic insight into this so called contract.1
Early decisions of the American courts denied any legal enforceability to
the collective bargaining agreement either to the principal parties collectively,
or to the individual workman as a member of the contracting union. 2 Since
the turn of the century, however, in an effort to protect the indi('idual worker,
and to give him some standing in a court of law, the courts, apart from any
statute, evolved three fictions or theories of enforcement of the labor con-
tract; namely, (1) the collective bargaining contract considered as a memoran-
dum of usage or custom; (2) the contract considered as establishing an agency
relationship; and (3) the agreement considered as a contract for the benefit of
third parties, the individual workmen, both members and non-members of
the contracting union.
Those courts purporting to follow the custom or usage theory have held
that the agreement between the union and the employer establishes a custom
or usage which may or may not enter into and become a part of the individual
contract of employment, depending upon proof that its terms were adopted
as part of the individual hiring. The leading case enunciating this principle is
'Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville; member of the Florida and
Kentucky Bars.
1. This reference is to Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947
.(Pub. L. No. 101 80th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1947); 29 U.S.C.A. See, 141 et seq. (Supp.,
July 1947) known as the Taft-Hartley Law. This provision will be discussed in detail.
2. St. L., I.M. and S.Ry. v. Matthews. 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W. 902 (1897). This decision
was followed in Petty v. Missouri & Arkansas Ry. Co., 205 Ark. 990, 167 S.W2d 895
(1943).
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Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans 6' T.P. Ry. Co. 3 In this case, the plaintiff
was discharged from the defendant railroad for an infraction of the company
rules. He based his cause of action for damages for wrongful discharge upon
a covenant contained in a collective bargaining agreement between the com-
pany and a union of which he was a member. The court ruled for the de-
fendant, stating that the collective bargaining agreement has legal force only
when the individual contract of employment was made with reference to it,
a fact not proved in this case. The court remarked further that the agreement
was not a "contract" as there was no consideration for its execution, and was
"not an offer as none of its terms could be construed as a proposal. . .. " 4 In
a case presenting fundamentally the same facts as the Hudson case, where
recovery was denied, the plaintiff employee recovered damages from the em-
ployer under the agreement for lost earnings as a result of wrongful dis-
charge.5 Under this theory damages have been recovered for overtime,6 and
for breach of seniority provision.7 The employee has also been able to receive
an injunction against the employer for interfering with his seniority rights,8
and in another case, a declaratory judgment was obtained 'to uphold his
seniority rights."
It is obvious that the application of the usage theory is inadequate to
solve current problems arising out of the collective bargaining process. In
the first place, the collective bargaining agreement may be rejected by the
employee contracting on other expressed terms,' 0 and in the second place,
beneficial provisions of the contract may not be utilized by the plaintiff worker
in the absence of affirmative proof that the individual contract of employment
was entered into with "knowledge" of the union agreement. 1 Furthermore,
although this theory purports to protect the individual worker, it presupposes
3. 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913).
4. The Hudson case was used as a basis for recovery by the plaintiff in a suit by the
employee to enjoin the union and his employer from deducting his dues, and to cancel his
union membership. Braddom et al. v. Three Point 'Coal Co., 288 Ky. 734, 740 (1941). The
principal case was used to defeat the plaintiff in Ill. Central Ry. Co. v. Moore, 142 F.2d
959, 964 (C.C.A. 5th 1940).
The most recent case relying on the Hudson case is Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d
876, 880 (C.C.A. 6th 1944). The court held for the plaintiff employee, and miscited the
principal case for the following proposition:
".... When the collective agreement is signed by the individual members of the employers'
association and the collective bargaining agent of the labor organization, no other con-
tract being shown, it becomes, until abrogated, the rule of the individual employer and
any person who thereafter continues in the employment of the employer or takes new
employment with him becomes entitled to all the benefits of the collective agreement and
incurs all its obligations."
5. Cross Mt. Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W.2d 692 (1928).
6. Keysaw v. Dotterweich Brewing Co., 121 App. Div. 58, 105 N.Y.Supp. 562 (1907).
7. Earle v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 25 Tenn. App. 660, 167 S.W.2d 15 (1942).
8. Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920), where seniority was considered
in the nature of a property right entitled to the protection of equity.
9. Piercy v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923).
10. See cases collected in Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44
HAV. L. REv. 522, 586, 596 (1930).
11. Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & R.P. Ry. Co., supro.
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no right of action by the employer or the union against one another under
the agreement.
Another equally unsatisfactory theory is based upon principles of agency.
Under this 'interpretation, the employee is the principal and the union is the
agent of the individual members of the organization with the legal power to
enter into binding contracts on their behalf. This principle was enunciated in
the case of Mueller v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. 12 where the court said:
... But it is plain that, the contract having been made by the representative
of the brotherhood on behalf of the "employees in train, engine and yard
service," plaintiff is entitled to sue on the contract as one made in his behalf
by a duly authorized agent. That is, this suit must be considered as one by
a party to, rather than by a mere beneficiary of, the contract.
The flaw in this theory is clear even on a superficial examination of or-
dinary principles of agency. In the first place, this body of law rests upon the
presupposition of a continuing "consentual relationship" between the agent
and the principal,' 3 a rule difficult to apply to these facts where the so-called
"principals" to be bound are a shifting body of plant employees.' 4 Futhermore,
it is puzzling to see how the union members could under ordinary principles of
agency sue the union as an agent on the contract for failure to carry out its
provisions with the union theoretically not a party to the agreement, the same
fundai'nentals precluding a suit by the union or the employer against each
other. Finally, it is clear that the union is in many re pects a principal contract-
ing separately in its own interests apart from the employees involved.
A third and more recent theory considers the collective bargaining contract
as a contract for the benefit of third parties. In other words, the union and
the company, as primary parties, exchange mutually binding promises, with
performance benefiting the employees as third party donee beneficiaries. The
leading case is Yaoo & MV. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard,'5 where the court re-
jected the Hudson line of cases as being anachronistic, and held that the non-
union member had a "sufficient interest" in the agreement to maintain suit.
...th holdings now are..that these agreements are primarily for the in-
dividual benefit of the mezubers of the organization, and that the rights se-
cured by these contracts are the individual rights of the individual mem-
bers of the union, and may be enforced directly by the individual.
But the case here before us involves, as would seem apparent, a still
further step, and that is whether appellee who is not a member of the union
12. 194 Minn. 83, 259 N.W. 798, 799 (1935). See also Gary v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co.,
37 Ga. App. 744, 141 S.E. 819 (1928).
Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., supra suggested that the union is the agent
of members for limited purpose of securing fair and just wages and good working
conditions, but cannot "waive any personal right" he may have.
13. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 20 (1933).
14. See 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 187 et seq. (2d Ed. 1914).
15. 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
which made the contract, but who has performed in accordance therewith,
can rely and sue for its benefits ... (1) when the terms of the contract are
expressly broad enough to include the third party either by name as one of
a specified class, and (2) the said third party was evidently within the in-
tent of the terms so used, the said party will be within its benefits, if (3)
the promissee had, in fact, a substantial and articulate interest in the welfare
of the said third party in respect to the subject of the contract.
Yazoo & M.1. Ry. Co. v. Webb,1 6 arose out of familiar facts. Both plain-
tiffs were non-union employees of the defendant railroad and brought suit un-
der the agreement for additional wages. Sideboard filed suit in the state court
and recovered upon the third party beneficiary theory, and Webb filed suit in
the Federal district court in Mississippi and lost under the usage theory.
Another leading case involving the third party beneficiary concept is
Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 1 7 where the nature of the collective
bargaining agreement was considered for the first time in Nebraska. After
examining the cases, the court said:
The only conclusion is that the decisions of our courts are in hopeless
conflict, but the questions involved are so important, and the issues at stake
so vital, that courts must not shirk the responsibility of a painstaking re-
search of all the facts and law in each case presented to them...
Dismissing the defense of lack of mutuality, the court permitted the plaintiff
union member to recover his back wages on a dubious third party beneficiary
theory,S
The courts have occasionally used this third party beneficiary theory as a
means of defeating the plaintiff employee. For example, the employee has been
denied recovery against the employer for damages for breach of seniority pro-
visions, 19 and has been denied an injunction against the employer for inter-
ference with seniority rights.20
This theory has two practical advantages over the preceding two dis-
cussed, since it permits a non-union employee to sue on the agreement, 2 1 and
permits the principal parties to modify the labor contract if the occasion re-
quires it, without the approval of the individual union member.2 2 Beyond
16. 64 F.2d 902 (C.C.A. 5th 1933).
17. 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934).
18. The Rentschler case was cited as authority for an opposite conclusion in Clark v,
Claremont Apartment Hotel Co., 19 Wash. 2d 115, 141 P.2d 403, 407 (1943).
19. Elder v. New York Central Ry. Co., 152 F.2d 361, 364 (C.C.A. 6th 1945).
20. In Shaup v. Grant Inter. Bro. of Loc. Engineers, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931)
the court held that seniority is not a property right and could be modified or changed at
any time in the agreement.
See Jurther Division of Labor Law Enforcement, Department of Industrial Relations
v. Dennis 183 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1947). Although a statute was indirectly involved
in this case, the court based its decision on the common law third party beneficiary theory.
21. Yazoo & M.V. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard, supra.
22. Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934). However, even this
advantage would not be available in those jurisdictions holding that a right once vested
in a third party beneficiary may not be modified without his consent.
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these limited advantages, the third party beneficiary approach carried further
would permit no suit against the employee by the employer, for a third party
beneficiary incurs no obligation under a contract for his benefit. In most union
contracts, as a matter of fact, not only does the employee incur obligations, but
frequently he is the chief instigator of the entire contract and approves or re-
jects it by his vote in the union meeting. He is not a "donee beneficiary" in any
sense of the word, but is a real party in interest reaping benefits as well as a
potential liability for a breach of the agreement.2 3
Many jurisdictions, however, still applying ordinary contract law, have
permitted suits by the union and the company against each other utilizing
none of the three preceding theories. 24 These courts have proceeded on the
apparent assumption that the labor contract is sufficiently analogous to the
ordinary bi-parte contract at least to permit the following results. For example,
the employer has been permitted to obtain an injunction to prevent a strike
threatened by a union in violation of its contract, 25 and to get a declaratory
judgment interpreting the agreement.2 6 In another situation, the employer
has been able to enjoin an employee from working for a competitor in viola-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement. 27 On the other hand, the union
has been permitted to enjoin the employer from threatening a lockout in viola-
tion of his union agreement,28 and from violating a closed shop agreement.20
In addition, it may be noted that the union has also been able to obtain a declar-
atory judgment interpreting the contract. 0
Still other courts, cognizant of the ramifications involved in the collective
bargaining agreement, have occasionally sought other terms of comparison
23. See analysis by Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YALE L. J.
195, 227 (1938).
24. This seems to be the current trend in some state decisions. See for example,
Suffridge v. O'Grady, 15 CCH LAB. CAS. § 74,500 (1948).
25. Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244 (1916). However, after
the workmen had once collectively quit their organization and their employer, it was
held in Lundoff-Bicknell Co. v. Smith, 24 Ohio App. 294, 156 N.E. 243 (1927) that
equity would not issue an order compelling them to go back to work, nor would it
indirectly attempt to accomplish this result by issuing a mandatory order that the officers
of the union use their power to make the men return to work.
26. Rambusch Decorating Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, 105 F.2d 134 (C.C.A. 2d
1939). cert. denied, 308 U.S. 587 (1939).
27. Whiting Milk Co. v. Grundin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N.E. 379 (1933).
28. In Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N.Y.Supp. 311 (1928) an employer
who was threatening to order a lockout of his employees in violation of his contract with
the union, was enjoined on the ground that the plaintiff union would have no adequate
remedy at law, and that the damages would be irreparable. The court said: "If the union
has not the right to invoke the aid of a court of equity to prevent the unlawful violation of a
contract such as exists in the case at bar, then such a contract loses most of its force, and
the rights of collective bargaining are narrowed, and the economic benefits to the commu-
nity from collective bargaining to a great extent lost."
29. Harper Small v. Local Union N. 520, I.B.E.Q. (Tex..Civ. App.) 48 S.W.2d 1033(1932). In this case the company defended on the ground that the contract was for per-
sonal services which could not be compelled by injunction and was therefore lacking in
mutuality as to that remedy. The court disregarded the plea.
30. CIO v. J. I. Case Co., 12 CCH LAB. CAS. § 63,617 (1947).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
apart from the three basic theories upon which they have ordinarily proceeded.
For example, one New Jersey court compared the collective bargaining
agreement to a "group insurance" policy, 3' while the Fifth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals considered the agreement similar to a treaty, -32
Obviously, these terms as comparisons are indicative of some progress in
recognizing the sui generis nature of the labor contract, but should be limited
to this use. The rights and liabilities of a group insurance policy are primarily
concerned with individual contractual rights, whereas the collective labor
contract emphasizes status giving rise to rights considerably more complex
than insurance liability. Furthermore, to place a collective bargaining agree-
ment in the same unenforceable category as a treaty at international law rele-
gates the parties to "self-help" to effectuate legitimate demands better served
on some accepted judicial basis.83
Regardless of the theory involved, many jurisdictions applying common
law concepts of procedure and substantive contract law have denied recovery
on the collective bargaining agreement becatse of one or several of the follow-
ing reasons: (1) union not suable as a corporate entity; 34 (2) lack of mutual-
ity;33 (3) policy against enforcement of personal service contracts;36 (4)
in restraint of trade; 37 (5) promise illusory ss
In summation, these common law decisions which have been considered,
although sound enough at times as isolated conclusions, are very unsatisfactory
as a basis for judicial precedent. In addition to their inherent inconsistency and
their limited scope, they reveal generally (1) different results on similar facts
under the same theory;30 (2) the use of different theories applied to similar
facts ;40 (3) application of time consuming, costly, common law procedural
impediments to a speedy determination of the real issues involved; 41 and (4)
31. Christiansen v. Local 680,126 N.J.Eq. 508, 10 A,2d 168 (1940).
32. Yazoo & M.V. Ry. Co. v. Webb, supra.
33. See Dickinson, New Conception of Contract in Labor Relations, 43 COL. L. REv.
688, 702-703 (1943).
34. Worthington Pump & Machinery Corp. v. Local No. 259, etc., 63 F. Supp. 411,
413 (D. Mass. 1945).
35. Davis v. Davis, 197 Ind. 386, 151 N.E. 134 (1926). An excellent case in point
is CIO v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, 12 CCH LAu. CAS. § 63,567 (1947),
where the court by way of dictum emphasized the necessity of finding "mutuality" and
"consideration." Said the judge: "In view of the state statute which 'declared that it is
lawful regardless of any undertaking made after March 13, 1941, to cause work
stoppage,' . . . it will require very careful study to determine the effect of the statute
and whether it has made collective bargaining contracts unenforceable."
36. Schwartz et al. v. Cigar Makers' Inter, Union, 219 Mich. 589, 189 N.W. 55 (1922).
37. Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 At. 600 (1913).
38. Moran v. Lasete, 221 App. Div. 118, 223 N.Y.Supp. 283 (1927).
39. Compare the Hudson case, supra, with Cross Mt. Coal Co. v. Ault, su pra, where
different results were reached on similar cases from the same usage theory.
40. Compare Yazoo & M.V. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard, supra, third party beneficiary theory
with Yazoo & M.V. Ry. Co. v. Webb, supra, usage theory, arising from similar facts.
See also note 4 and note 18 supra.
41. Note the facts in Ill. Central Ry. Co. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959 (C.C.A. 5th 1940),
where the plaintiff worker brought his original action in the state court in 1932. Four years
later, judgment was rendered against him in the State Supreme Court. In 1936 he filed
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different, fundamental approaches to the issues based on the personal attitude
of the court rather than on an objective underlying legal premise.4 2
The legislative enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935.43
and the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 44 known as the Taft-Hartley
Law, have placed the labor contracts of industries dealing in interstate com-
merce in an entirely different light, and as a result, require a re-evaluation of
applicable contract principles.
The National Labor Relations Act, prior to its 1947 amendments, was not
directly concerned with collective bargaining agreements. Its raison d'etrc
was to protect the workers in the process of collective bargaining by citing
certain employer interferences as "unfair labor practices. '4- According to the
proponents of this legislation, the "equality of bargaining power" was thereby
maintained, and the channels of interstate commerce were not disrupted by in-
dustrial strife. The over-all purpose of the Taft-Hartley Law is the same, ex-
cept that it expands the legislative requirements in an attempt to place equal
responsibility upon the union in the preservation of industrial peace. Specifical-
ly, Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Law provides that suits may be brought
against labor unions as legal entities for a breach of collective agreements.
These actions may be brought in any district court of the United States against
another action concerning the same employment in the state court; after struggling
through demurrers, a plea in abatement, and a remanding by the state court, he reached
a district court of the United. States where the doctrine of Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkias
forced him back to his original position. When he finally reached the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit, in 1940, he lost because of the application of the three year
state statute of limitations on "contracts."
42. Compare Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. United Auto. Workers of America,
160 P.2d 113, 117 (1945), aff'd, 167 P.2d. 725, where the counsel for the union, in the
course of the trial argued that a particular interpretation would better maintain "employer-
employee relationship." The court answered this argument by saying that "it is not
for us to decide whether it would be desirable to add the amendment, but only
whether the contract admits of the amendment. Being a court and vested with no
administrative powers, but only judicial powers, and those well defined by the
Constitution, statutes, and sound precedent, we must approach our problems and
solve them from the standpoint of law and not of economic expediency . . .", with
McNeil v. Peoples Life Ins. Co., 43 A.2d 293, 294 (D.C. 1945), where the court said: "A
collective bargaining agreement represents an accord between the employer and the
bargaining representative as to terms which will govern hiring and work and pay, and
such an agreement 'ought to be construed not narrowly, and technically but broadly and
so as to accomplish its evident aims.'" Query: In the Consolidated Vultee case, supra, is
not the court in fact basing its decision on its own conception of "economic expediency"
when in reversing both the permanent referee and the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
it was held that a labor contract which provided: (1) that the employer reserved the
exclusive right to employ and discharge employees and (2) that in the event of dispute of
"desirability" of amendment, the matter would be referred to the grievance procedure, the
award of the arbitrator in imposing a maintenance of membership clause was a denial of
"substantial right" of the employer. The justice cites no authority, either statutory or
constitutional, or any precedent, "sound" or otherwise, to support his conclusion, that the
employer's right could not be modified under these particular circumstances.
43 49 STAT. 450, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1935).
44. See note I supra.
45. "The right asserted by the Board is not one arising upon or derived from the
contracts between petitioner and its employers. The Board asserts a public right vested in
it as a public body. charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor
practices .. " National Licorice Co. v. N.L.R.B., 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940).
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a union which represents employees in any industry affecting commerce, with-
out regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties.
It is apparent that this last provision has a direct bearing on the nature of
any collective bargaining agreements entered into by employees covered by
the Act.
Apart from Section 301, and the decisions under it, the c6urts and the
National Labor Relations Board, as the administrative agency charged with
the responsibility of carrying out the provisions of the Act, and effectuating
the broad Congressional policy, have occasionally expressed theories of the
nature of the collective bargaining agreement either openly, or by analogy
and description, as incident to the prosecution of unfair labor practice charges
or in certification proceedings. These theories and the administrative rulings
of the National Labor Relations Board together with the decisions of the
courts under the Act, have to a certain extent, placed limitations and require-
ments on the collective bargaining agreement. It is believed that these limita-
tions and requirements, placed on the agreement either by implication or
direct ruling, prevent the possible application of the three common law
theories previously discussed, and simultaneously, they give birth to the forma-
tion of a new theory of the nature of the agreement.
The manner in which the common law theories of the enforcement of the
agreement have become inapplicable can best he seen by an individual exami-
nation of the cases involved. For example, the following case clearly indicates
the inconsistency of the usage theory with a Supreme Court interpretation of
the National Labor Relations Act.
In the J. 1. Case Company v. National Labor Relations Board case, 46
the company offered each employee an individual contract of employment.
About 75% of the employees accepted and worked under these agreements.
it was not found or contended that the contracts were coercive, obtained by
unfair labor practices, or that they were not valid under the circumstances in
which they were made. The company (1) refused to bargain with the union on
matters covered by the individual agreements, and (2) offered to bargain on
all matters after the expiration of the contracts.
The Board held that the refusal to bargain was a violation of Section
8(5) of the Act, and the company was ordered to cease and desist from giv-
ing effect to the contracts. The Circuit Court of Appeals granted an order of
46. 321 U.S. 332 (1944). For further analysis of the effect of the Act on individual
contracts, see Rice, The Legal Significance of Labor Contracts under the National Labor
Relations Act, 37 Micli. L. REV. 696, 703 (1939) and Notes, 57 HARv. L. REv. 110 (1943),
9 Mo. L. REv. 256 (1944). After this decision by the Supreme Court, the J. I. Case Com-
pany was still insistent that the individual employees had bargaining rights. As a conse-
quence, the company entered into a contract with the union limiting its authority to rep-
resent all employees within the appropriate bargaining unit, and permitting individual
bargaining by the remaining employees. The Court held that the contract was invalid.
CIO v. J. I. Case Co., 12 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 63,617 (1947).
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enforcement. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the individual contracts were
held to be no bar to the bargaining requested by the Board. Mr. Justice Jack-
son in delivering the opinion of the Court discussed the nature of the collective
bargaining agreement:
Contract in labor law is a term the implications of which must be de-
termined from the connection in which it appears. . . . Without pushing the
analogy too far, the agreement may be likened to the tariffs established by
a carrier, or standard provisions prescribed by supervising authorities for
insurance policies, or to utility schedules of rates and rules for service,
which do not of themselves establish any relationships but which do govern
the terms of the shipper or insurer or customer relationship whenever and
with whomever it may be established. . . . But, however engaged, an em-
ployee becomes entitled by virtue of the Labor Relations Act somewhat as
a third party beneficiary to all benefits of the collective trade agreement, even
if on his own he would yield to less favorable temns. The individual hiring
contract is subsidiar' to the terms of the trade agreement and may not waive
any of its benefits, any more than a shipper can contract away the benefit of
filed tariffs, the insurer the benefit of established rates. . . . Whenever
private contracts conflict with its functions (of the Board) they obviously
must yield or the Act would he reduced to futility ...
As previously discussed, the usage theory permits the worker to waive
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement in his individual em-
ployment contract. As indicated by this decision, however, the relegation of
the collective bargaining agreement to a secondary position is invalid under
the Act. A further elaboration of this point is to be found in the case of Gatliff
Coal Company v. CoV. 4 7 In the words of the court:
. . . the National Labor Relations Act, in the public interest, has given
such collective agreements a more secure and stable position in our national
economy than that of ordinary common law contracts which may be altered
at pleasure by rendering ineffectual and unavailable any collateral agree-
ments between individual members of the collective bargaining group de-
signed to obtain a diminution of the obligations of a particular employer or
abridgment of the benefits accruing to particular employees under the col-
lective agreement, regardless of the circumstances which may be relied
upon to justify them or the terms thereof. To hold otherwise . .. would re-
duce the National Labor Relations Act to a mere futility and leave col-
lective agreements no stronger than the weakest members of the union.
It is evident from these cases that the usage theory is completely abro-
gated. To proceed to the decisions involving employee representation under
the Act, it can be seen that the agency theory has likewise been rejected.
The selection of the representative for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing under Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act involves at times
as a condition precedent to the entertainment of the representative proceedings,
a determination of the effect to be given to an existing collective bargaining
47. 59 Fed. Supp. 882 (1945), aff'd, 142 F.2d 880 (C.C.A. 6th 1945).
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agreement after a shift in membership from the contracting union to a new
union. Should the old contract be disregarded in toto, as a matter of law, be-
cause the new petitioning union represents in fact a majority of the unit, or
should the contract, valid when made, carry over in some way as binding on
the new union? This presents a difficult problem for the Board as Section 9
provides no articulate standard by which a conclusion can be reached.
It might be suggested that the agency theory of enforcement and inter-
pretation of the labor contract would provide a solution. Under this theory,
the principal employees, entering into a collective bargaining agreement
through their agents, would be bound by the resulting agreement until its ex-
piration date, and, in the absence of any unfair labor practices surrounding the
signing of the contract, could not retroactively void legitimate actions of un-
questioned agents. This problem was squarely presented to the Board in the
case of Matter of Container Corporation 48 where the majority opinion held
the existing contract not a bar to an immediate election. Mr. Gerald D. Reilly,
applying the agency theory suggested, dissented. A detailed examination of
the case defines, it is believed, the approach of the Board toward the collective
bargaining agreement.
In this case, pursuant to a consent election in April, 1943, the Anderson
Corrugated Box Workers Union, Local 456, was certified as the collective
bargaining representative of the company's production and maintenance em-
ployees. In July, 1943, this local signed a contract to be in effect for one year.
Upon its expiration in July, 1944, a new one year contract was negotiated and
signed by the local.
On August 22nd, the Paper Workers Organizing Committee wrote to
the company stating that its local organization represented a majority of the
production and maintenance employees, and requested recognition, which the
company refused because of its contract with Local 456.
The hearing before the Board revealed the following: (1) Since the exe-
cution of the contract, only three meetings of the local were called; (2) the
membership never ratified the agreement: (3) the union shop provision of
the agreement was not complied with: (4) although all stewards refused to
collect dues by the end of August, the president of Local 456 made no attempt
to remove any steward or to appoint others. These, and other facts presented,
indicated that Local 456 had for some time ceased to function as a representa-
tive of the employees of the. company.
The issue was whether the purposes and policies of the Act were best ef-
fectuated by directing an inimediate election, or by reqairing the company's
employees to forego the selection 'of a bargaining representative until the
terminal date of the contract.
48. 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945).
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The majority opinion of the Board held that the contract was not a bar
to an immediate election. The conclusion was reached, based not on technical
contract or agency principles, but "by weighing two basic interests of em-
ployees and society which the Act was designed to foster and protect, namely,
the interest in stability of industrial relations" . . . preserved in most cases
by recognition of a collective bargaining agreement and "the somewhat con-
flicting interest in employees full freedom to choose their bargaining represen-
tatives." Said the Board:
But where it appears that the contract either in its form or provisions,
orin its operation, does not serve to stabilize industrial relations in the man-
ner contemplated by the statute, the Board holds that it presents no obstacle
to the employees' present exercise of their right to choose a bargaining repre-
sentative. 49
The Board was careful to restrict itself within the confines of the par-
ticular case, and attempted to make it clear that it was establishing no new
principles of general applicability to the law of contracts by setting f6rth the
following proposition in the footnote:
We also assume, to the extent material, the validity of such contracts
under general legal principles, although it is not our province to define or
enforce the legal rights and obligations of the parties under contract.
Mr. Reilly dissented on the ground that since there "is nothing either in
this record or in the findings of the majority which negate the contention that
the collective agreement now in effect between this Company and the Press-
men's Union . . . is a valid contract." he could find no legal basis for permitting
an election prior to the expiration date of the contract. He continued:
Granted that, in the absence of these local union officers, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to administer the grievance provisions of the
contract, I still cannot find any legal theory for setting aside the contract,
since it is obvious that the principals to the contract, viz :-the employees,
-are the ones responsible for liquidating their bargaining agent.
I do not question that they have a right to revoke the authority of their
agent, but such revocation can apply only perspectively and cannot be used
to invalidate any lawful obligations undertaken by such agent during the
period in which representative capacity was not questioned.
With reference to the majority's remark that they were not passing on
the "validity of such contracts," Mr. Reilly replied:
49. The Board went on to cite the following as examples of contracts "considered not
a bar to an election: oral contracts; a.situation where the contract if given effect as a
bar would foreclose for an unreasonable time the employees' opportunity to change repre-
sentatives"; contracts which lacked substantive provisions fixing terms and conditions of
employment, contracts where recognition and closed shop clauses consistently disregarded
in practice; "complement of employees greatly expanded since execution of contract";
"contracts otherwise repugnant to statutory policy"; and a contract involved in a "dispute
as to which -of two labor organizations was the legal successor to the union which
negotiated the contract." (citations omitted)
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The view has occasionally been advanced that, in holding a contract
not to be a bar to a redetermination of representatives, the Board is not
passing upon the validity of the contract, and hence, the contracting union is
still free to enforce its contract in a state court. Such a theory cannot be
supported. The effect of a new certification imposes upon an employer a
legal obligation to bargain exclusively with the certified union, and, hence.
by the same token to refrain from any further relationship with the contract-
ing union. Hence whenever our order is valid, the "supreme law clause" of
the Federal constitution would prevent an employer from being placed in
the dilemma of being subject to a conflicting decree by a state court....
Mr. Reilly has thus made it clear that the majority of the Board, in hold-
ing the existing contract not a bar to an election, has rejected the second of
the common law theories of interpretation, namely, that of a true agency re-
lationship. Another issue in this case, secondary to the representative pro-
ceedings but important to an analysis of the nature of the labor contract is
presented by this question: When the court holds a contract not a bar to
representative proceedings, what would be the position of the employer in a
suit on the contract by the employees in a common law court? If the premise
of the majority be correct, namely, that they were not passing upon "the
validity of such contracts under general legal principles" it would follow that
such a suit could be maintained. It is submitted, however, in accordance with
the thesis of the dissent, that the effect of the majority ruling by the Board is
to void the existing agreement which is outweighed by the superior public
interest represented by the policies of the Act. In support of this conclusion,
consider, for example, the following Massachusetts decision on the point.
In Sanford et al. v. Boston Edison Co.. 5° certain officers of the union
brought a bill in equity for specific performance of a trade agreement, particu-
larly with reference to a provision for the check off of dues. The contract in
question, entered into on May 24, 1940, included "working foreman," and
provided for the check off, On January 15, 1943, a rival union petitioned
the National Labor Relations Board for certification, as did the plaintiff, after
unsuccessfully arguing that the contract was a bar to the proceeding. Three
units were certified by the Board, and in the subsequent election the plaintiff
won in all three units. Certain supervisory employees covered by the contract
of 1940 were excluded from the units and election by the Board. The question
was whether the company was excused from checking off wages of those em-
ployees who were, by the decision of the Board, excluded from the bargaining
units and from being represented by the union in bargaining with the company.
The court dismissed the bill, and held that the Board, in its certification pro-
ceedings, acted independently of the agreement. It was urged, as pointed out
in the Container case, supra, that the "essential validity of the agreement"
was not passed upon in the Board's proceedings, ;tnd thus the state court had
50. 64 N.E. 2d 631, 632-634 (Mass. 1946).
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jurisdiction to entertain this action on the contract. The court answered this
argument:
We think it would be inconsistent with the (certificates of) certifica-
tion, which excluded the union from representing these supervisory em-
ployees as their collective bargaining agency with the Company, to compel
the Company to recognize the union as such agency for its enforcement of
the collective bargaining agreement of May 24, 1940, in so far as it applied
to these supervisory employees.
The result of the certification was that the scope of the authority of
the Union as bargaining agent under the agreement was restricted to those
employees who the Board ruled were represented by the union....
In other words, the effect of this decision by the state court was to con-
sider that the old contract becomes inoperative as a matter of law upon certifi-
cation of the statutory representative. 1
It is likewise believed that the third party beneficiary concept is no more
applicable as a basic theory of interpretation tinder the Act than the other
common law fictions. Although Mr. Justice Douglas, in the Case Company de-
cision, stated that "an employee becomes entitled by virtue of the Labor Re-
lations Act somewhat as a third party beneficiary to all benefits of the collec-
tive trade agreement.. ." the qualifying word "somewhat" makes it clear that
the justice is speaking by analogy only, referring to the fact that the employee
receives benefits from the National Labor Relations Act particularized through
the medium of the collective bargaining agreement entered into by a properly
certified union. Beyond this, the same technical objections, previously dis-
cussed in reference to the common law decisions, apply.
The impact on the collective bargaining agreement by the National La-
bor Relations Act and the decisions under it with reference to representative
proceedings and unfair labor practices may be summed up as follows:
The commdn law theories of usage, agency, and third party beneficiary
have been proved inapplicable to the collective bargaining agreement. Af-
firmatively, it is evident that the authority of the union to negotiate the agree-
ment,5 2 the extent of the unit,53 and the duration of the agreement, 54 all
originate in Congress and in the determination of the Board. Furthermore, an
agreement, if reached, must be in writing, 5 and the content of the agreement
may be examined 50 to see whether the parties have bargained "in good
faith." 57
51. To the same effect is the opinion expressed by Chairman Madden in Matter of
Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N.L.R.B. at 141 (1940).
52. Matter of Container Corporation. supra.
53. Sanford at al. v. Boston Edison Co., supra.
54. Reed Roller Bit Company, 72 N.L.R.B. 157 (1947).
55. H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514 (1941). See also Ward, The Mechanics
of Collective Bargaining, 53 HMAv. L. REv. 753 (1940).
56. Matter of Timken Roller Bearing Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 39 (1946).
57. The courts have held that the employer must bargain "in good faith" to satisfy the
requirements of the Act. General Electric Co. v. Gojack, 68 Fed. Supp. 686 (U.S. Dist.
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It is submitted that such an agreement so conditioned by legislative and
judicial fiat is clearly not a "contract" in the accepted bi-parte sense. Rather,
it seems that Congress has in effect delegated to the properly certified repre-
sentative and the employer, within the framework of the law, the authority to
draw up rules and regulations to govern the relationship between management
and the employees in the unit involved. '58 This inference has found support in
a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which
characterizes the agreement as the "industrial constitution of the enter-
prise." 59
In other words, the effect of the national legislation is to restrict "liberty
of contract" of employers and of unions to the right of merely drafting local
industrial regulations providing substantive standards for the conduct of the
group enterprise, thus taking the collective bargaining agreement out of the
realm of the common law contract and placing it on a different status.
The question may well be asked at this point whether Section 301 of the
Taft Hartley Law, as written,6 0 in subjecting the collective bargaining agree-
ment to common law enforcement in the federal district court, represents a
workable approach that is consistent with the sai generis nature of the instru-
Ct. 1946). Under the Taft-Hartley Law the union must also "bargain in good faith."
Times Publisihing Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 767 (1947).
58. "Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers com-
parable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of
those whom it represents ..." Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
59. National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park Mfg. Company, 110 F.2d 632,
638 (C.C.A. 4th 1940).
The conclusion that the labor contract has broader implications than an ordinary
bi-parte contract has found support in texts and law reviews for years, In 1918, Professor
Duguit aroused considerable comment by the following analysis:
"The collective labor contract is an agreement or taw regulating the relations of
two social classes. It is by no means a contract giving rise to special, concrete, and
temporary obligations between two juristic subjects. It is a law establishing permanent
relationships between two social groups, the legal rule according to which the
individual contracts between members of these two groups are to be concluded. Just
as the articles of association are the law for a group, in the same way the clauses of a
collective contract are the law which governs the relations between the two social
groups."
Although Duguit denied any legal obligations to the collective. agreement, he was
one of the first to recognise the deeper implications in the status relationship which
inevitably arises upon the execution of such a contract. More recent writers have charac-
terized the agreement as a source of "industrial common law," GOLDEN ANn RUTTENBER,,
THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 121 (1942); "a super-contract or norm,"
Rice, The Legal Significance of Labor Cdntracts under the National Labor Relations
Act, 37 Micn. L. RF.v. 696, 722 (1939): "a statutory collective contract" lenhoff, The
Present Statuts of Collective Contracts in tire American Legal System, 39 MicH. L. REv.
1109, 1138 (1941) ; and as an element in "representative government a- applied to labor
relations." See note, 38 MIcH. L. R~v. 516, 521 (1940).
60. There is good evidence to believe that § 301, in some form, will survive the
present 81st Congress, Consider President Truman's recent remarks to Congress on
January 5. 1949:
"The Wagner Act should be reenacted . . .certain improvements are needed ...
The use of economic force to determine issues arising out of the interpretation of existing
contracts should be prohibited ...." N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1949, § 1, p. 4, col. 3.
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ment, implicit in the document itself and the decisions under the remainder of
the National Labor Relations Act.
The reasoning underlying tlhe passage of Section 301 is not difficult to
follow. When the 80th Congress was considering enactment of remedial labor
legislation, it was faced with the fact that effective collective bargaining re-
quires an employment contract that is binding on all parties. The Congression-
al attitude was that "breaches of collective agreements have become so nu-
merous that it is not sufficient to allow the parties to invoke the processes of
the National Labor Relations Board when such breaches occur ... ." It was
felt "... that'the aggrieved party should also have a right of action in the
Federal Courts." 6,
The legislators remarked:
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such
agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The execution of an
agreement does not by itself promote industrial peace. The chief advantage
which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective labor agreement
is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the agrient.
Without some effective method of assuring freedom from economic welfare
for the term of the agreement, there is little reason why an employer would
desire to sign such a contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to promote
industrial peace through faithful performance by the parties, collective
agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforceable in the Fed-
eral Courts ...
In other words, faced with the problem of harmonizing the economic and
social interests of the unions as representatives of workers, and management,
Congress felt (1) that unions were not observing their labor agreements, thus
promoting industriM strife, (2) labor contracts were not generally enforceable
in the state courts because of the inability to sue unions as entities, (3) the
prosecution of unfair labor practices did not provide a sufficient sanction
against such undesirable conduct. Therefore, in the words of Section 301 (a) :
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
Viewing this provision critically, it appears to be entirely procedural in
its nature; its proponents advanced as the legal necessity for its enactment the
inability of employers to sue because of procedural impediments in the state
61. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE ON THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT OF 1947, Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist
Sess. 15 (1947).
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courts. Yet the one court in which its constitutionality has been tested held
that 301 (a) provides for the enforcement of "substantive rights" created by
the Act,62 although no standards are provided by which the interpretation and
enforcement of the agreement can be determined.
In spite of the noteworthy purpose underlying the enactment of this
statute, the failure of Congress to provide the necessary guiding principles to
assist the judges in the determination of the critical issues inherent in any
labor contract leaves the court in the position where the common law decisions
discredited in theory and in fact, pertaining to labor contracts, establish the
only criteria available for precedent. Furthermore, the decisions analyzed prove
that most judges are not equipped by training or experience to decide without
some assistance the emotional and economic issues arising from the employ-
ment relationship.
Just how to retain the essence of the common law contract dignified by
public respect and enforced in the courts, within the si generis concept of
the collective bargaining agreement, and then to fit these elements effectively
into the completed structure of collective bargaining to achieve industrial peace
is the main problem.
A suggested answer lies (1) in frankly recognizing that the labor con-
tract is a focal point in a social and economic relationship fully as complex as
the regulation of transportation, public utilities, or the issuance and sale of
securities, and (2) in utilizing a court structure expert enough to sense the
intangible implications involved and flexible enough to effectuate the demand
for whatever special remedies are needed.
Today we are in the early stages of point (I) of the suggested answer to
the problem. It is believed that complete fruition of point (I) can be realized
only by certain adjustments in our existing legislative machinery, and in our
general national thinking with reference to the labor contract. In the first
place, it may well be argued that the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board should be extended to give it primary jurisdiction in all matters affect-
ing labor disputes. '3 The Board should have the power not only to interpret
the collective bargaining agreement but also should have the power of en-
forcement.6 4 For example, cease and desist orders should be utilized in the
place of the present equity injunction.
62. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., Inc. v. International Union United Furniture
Workers of America, 76 Fed. Supp. 493 (D.C.Md. 1948).
63. For a general discussion of special labor courts see BRAUN, THE SETTLEMENT OF
INDUSTR IAL DISPUTES 261 et seq. (1944).
64. This suggestion to delegate the right to interpret and enforce a labor contract to
an administrative agency may raise a constitutional question under U.S. CONST. ART. III,
§ I ; "The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in One Supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
For example, it may be argued.that the interpretation and enforcement of the contract is
a "judicial function" traditionally handled by an established court of law and the attempt
to place this responsibility in the hands of an administrative agency would be an unconsti-
tutional delegation of "judicial power" under Art. III, sufpra.
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From a practical standpoint, the highly integrated industrial development
of this country with its emphasis on centralized personnel policies radiating
from a central source and arising in part, inJmany cases, from a master union
agreement covering all plants wherever located, presents problems to the
employer, the employee, and the union of a basic similar nature regardless of
the jurisdiction in which they arise. To channelize litigation arising from a col-
lective bargaining agreement into a federal agency composed of experts who
will realize (1) that the complex instrument they are interpreting is the in-
dustrial constitution of that particular industry and (2) will rely on precedents
sound in fact as well as law in the enforcement of that instrument, will in-
crease confidence in the courts by industry, labor, and the general public, and
will lend stability to a growing body of industrial law. 65
It may be argued, on the other hand, that the extension of the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board is not attainable. If this be true, it is
believed that the general aims just outlined can be achieved by providing in
Section 301, that all federal district judges be provided with the services of
a special master or commissioner. These judicial assistants, experts in the
field of industrial relations, would take the evidence informally, but according
to practical judicial standards, and make recommendations to be passed on by
the judge. They would be assigned to each circuit, and be available to' any dis-
trict faced with a labor law problem. By this device, the quality of "expertness"
will be satisfied without disturbing the basic framework of the law now :n
existence.
In the second place, the United States Arbitration Act which provides
for a stay of proceedings in a suit upon an issue referable to arbitration under
an arbitration agreement until such arbitration is had, should be amended to
include "employment contracts" currently excepted from the provisions of
the Act.6 6 This statute has been involved in litigation several times during the
past year in suits for enforcement under Section 301, and the courts, in taking
jurisdiction, decided the issues in spite of arbitration provisions provided in
It is further suggested, howeVer, that this objection may be answered by (1)
providing adequate substantive and procedural standards in the statute extending this
jurisdiction, such as (a) a right to a "full hearing" before the agency and (b) the right
of a reviewing court of law to have exclusive jurisdiction to airm, modify, or set aside
an order, in whole or in part, with findings of fact of the Board, to be conclusive if
supported by the evidence. It is believed that the excellent draftsmanship of § 24(a)
"Court Review of Orders" of the "Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935" would
provide an adequate model to withstand any attacks on the constitutionality of this
proposal.
. 65. Brown, The Judicial Regulation of Industrial Conditions, 27 YALE L. J. 427
(1918). This article presents an interesting study of what Australia and New Zealand
have done in the extension of the "sphere of the State" in relation to the control of
induslrial relations. The author emphasizes the "separate development of a body of indus-
trial law, coherent and composed of judicial principles, analogous to but not necessarily
the same as ordinary 'civil law.'"
66. Act of February 12, 1925, c. 213 (as reenacted by the Act of July 30, 1947, C. 392,
9 U.S.C.A. 1).
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the grievance procedure of the contract.6 7 The effect of including employment
contracts in the Arbitration Act will be to force the parties to utilize and ex-
haust all administrative remedies at the local level before resorting to court'
action. It is believed that this .type of settlement will in most cases be more
productive of future harmonious relations than that effectuated by the super-
imposed rigid court of law.
Regardless of necessary changes in existing legislation, a solemn obli-
gation rests on all law teachers, lawyers, and the industrial relations experts
of both management and the union, to realize that within the boundaries of
every industrial organization there exists a community of individuals with
mutual interests in the promotion of the success of that industrial organization,
and individual interests in their own security and advancement. These inter-
ests, mutual and conflicting, are as local to that industry in many respects as
those of the citizens of New York and Florida with respect to their state
sovereign interests. It should be recognized that when the "citizens" of this
industrial community arrive at a working agreement which may be both a
settlement of existing problems and a projection of future working conditions,
such an agreement can be interpreted owly in the light of disputes previous
to and arising out of the agreement and the course of their arbitration and
settlement. The difficulties giving rise to each particular provision and the
history of collective bargaining in that plant must be understood.68 The roots
of a dispute thus frequently reach much deeper than the printed words on
the paper of the collective bargaining agreement, and a legal judgment for
the payment of money from one side or the other because of the apparent
"breach of contract" frequently no more settles the problem than if a wife or
husband sued the other in a court of law for breach of the marriage contract
and continued to live together in hopeful harmony.
Many such local disputes arise from years of resentment against poor per-
sonnel policy and continued misunderstanding between management and labor.
Obviously, in such cases, mutual trust and understanding are not fostered by
formal legal proceedings where the parties must continue to work side by
side in the future. Of course, a farsighted and wise personnel policy would
prevent and anticipate many difficulties 'hich could flare into actual disputes.
67. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., tic., v. International UIion United Furniture
Workers of America, supra; Matson Navigation Co. v. National Union of Marine Cooks
and Stewards, 14 CCH LAB. CAS. 5, 64,521 (1948).
68. "The industrial aspect carries us into another sphere, not that of legal contract
theory or technique, but that of the social and political effects of contract, and especially
of contract as an instrument of unofficial government . . . in the self-government of
sub-groups contract provides an original framework, a constitution, a source of ultimate
sanction in dispute or breakdown . . . but for the running of affairs they say but little.
The play of personality, the unrecorded adjustment from day to day, further factual
agreement from time to time, informed by usage, and by initiative and acquiescence which
do not even call for conscious agreeing . . . these are what fill the contract framework
with a living content. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?. 40 Cot.. L. Rev. 704, 728
(1931).
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The administration of a collective bargaining contract is essentially a human
problem, since it deals with the ways and habits of human beings, their re-
lations to one another in responsibilities and authorities, and their common
welfare. A strike or lockout is less a violation of a legal document than it is
the breakdown of union-management relations."
Recognizing all of these facts, the law teacher in teaching labor law, the
practicing attorney, and the industrial relations expert, should not be quick
to seize upon traditional confining legal "contract" concepts in this applica-
tion, but should emphasize the prevention of disputes at the local level, and if
they occur, should completely exhaust all grievance procedures provided by
the agreement. The importance of fair and thorough arbitration, and a re-
luctance to take such a case to court in the absence of extraordinary circum-
stances such as unwarranted economic force amounting to a breach of the
agreement, cannot be overemphasized. If preventive measures and all methods
of arbitration are exhausted first, actual litigation will be rare. When it does
occur, attempting to put square pegs in round holes by forcing the labor prob-
lem into traditional legal molds is only a superficial solution which may result
in even more bitter resentment and increased industrial instability. The process
of collective bargaining is the cornerstone of our industrial and social peace,
and it cannot be successful until the importance and true nature of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement is understood.
69. GOLDEN AND RUTTENBERG, supra at 91.
